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Morals, Science, and Sociality:
The Foundations 0/ Ethics
and Its Relationship to Science
Volume III
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Daniel Callahan, Editors
The Hastings Center, Hastings-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1978. x + 339 pp., $7.95 (pap er).
This vol um e, the third in a projected series of four, contains the proceedings of
meetings held at the Hastings Center where scholars of several disciplines were
invited to speak on the relation of science to ethics. This general issue comprehe nds any number of distinct topics, all well-known landmarks in the topograph y
of the is-ought gap: Can one deduce ethical principles from scientific truths and, if
so, which science and which truths? Does science itself, either as an activity or as a
body of knowledge , presuppose certain moral principles? If so, which ones? What,
exactly, is the difference between ethics and science?
An anthology on "ethics and science" runs the risk of being ill-focused if it
attempts to deal with too many of these topics , and the prese nt co ll ection of
loosely-related papers does not escape this problem . The wide variation among
these papers in terms of style, difficulty, and level of abstraction, though
undoubtedly in part an unavoidable by-product of the editors' desire for interdisciplinary exchange, reinforces the centrifugal forces at work. Nevertheless, severa l excellent papers can be found h ere and might serve to attract readers interested in the topics they pursu e.
As it happens , the two most rewarding essays keep to ethical theory and ignore
science altogether. In the first of these, Gerald Dworkin examin es and rebuts
success ively weaker versions of the "v iew of the moral agent as necessar ily autonomous." This is the claim that, roughly speaking, each moral agent must make an
indepe ndent choice of moral principles and must accept full responsibility for the
content of his moral code. This view, or something like it, is taken as boringly
obvious by most secular moralists (and many religious moralists as well), and
Dworkin 's opposition to it endows his essay with special interest. Dworkin 's delineat ion of six distinct theses which approximate the claim of moral autonomy
provides the debate with needed precision of thought; his evaluation of each
version, negative for each, save the very weakest, challenges the prevailing complacent acceptance of this vi ew as well. Careful contemplation of his essay would
reward anyone who reflexively insists that each person is his or h er only legitimate
source of moral authority.
In the other outstanding paper, Gregory Vlastos provides a n account of the
conception of justice embodied in Plato's Republic, which h e locates in a principle
of " functional reciprocity" : to eac h according to his needs in performing his
function for the community. The distribution of burde ns and benefits which
results from this principle is distinctly inegalitarian, but , as Vlastos shows, it is
clearly distinguishable from m ere oligarchic privilege. Vlastos goes b eyond reconstruction to argue that functional rec iprocity fails as a co ncept ion of justice even
by Plato's own standards since it co ntradicts what Vlastos beli eves to be a feature
of every morality, including Plato 's, namely that all m embers of the community
have an equal right to ben efit by the observance of moral rul es and an equal right
to pass judgment on the basis of them. Plato's principl e has obvious echoes in
prese nt-day ordinary moral ity (though, of course, many of the background
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assumptions are different), and if Vlastos' claim of a right to equal consideration
proves to be destructive to it, his paper will be of more than historical interest.
The papers which do address science's relation to ethiCS are generally less
enlightening (at least on that topic). A lasdair MacIntyre addresses one key question directly, namely whether scientific work intrinsically presupposes certain
moral principles. MacIntyre argues against the recent subjectivist wave in philosophy of science - a wave which has anyhow crested - by stressing realism as a
regulative ideal wh ich, to MacIntyre, is moral in character. Thus he says that the
historical course of science is understandable only if we view science as resting on
moral foundations. However , the precise sense in which realism is a moral stance,
and hence in which "science is a morality," was not made clear to this reader.
Other "regulative ideals," such as logical consistency, are not moral in any interesting sense , and the reader is left wondering why realism is any different.
Loren Graham offers a discussion of genetics and politics in Russia and Germany in the twenties, showing that the later official pro- and anti- Lamarckian
stances of the Communist and Nazi governments, respectively, could not have
been predicted with complete confidence. The moral of this interesting storythat the seeming affinity of the respective political ideologies and scientific
theories was undetermined by the theories - is instructive in the case presented,
but, as another contributor remarks, whether and to what extent this is a general
truth cannot be established by a single example. In any case, the resulting thesis
on science's relation to ethics is not a particularly deep one ; the study is historical
rather than philosophical.
Richard Alexander's essay provides a sociobiological account of law, ethics and
many other elements of culture; like many such accounts it both prevents an
intriguing perspective on what it seeks to explain and simultaneously invites disbelief by its undisciplined speculation. Alexander claims to have shown that "the"
function of law in society is to regulate its individuals' efforts to reproduce so as
to assure social cohesion, which in turn fosters reproduction ; and he locates the
cause of societies' exis tence in the need to protect their m embers from the predations of similar groups of humans. Alexander marshalls two sources of support for
these hypoth eses. The first is the Darwinist thesis itself, modified by contemporary theory: the principle of differential reproduction explains all. The second
consists of numerous "predictions" of what culture would be like were Alexander's hypotheses true - all of which turn out to match reality. These "predictions," however, have been too carefully chosen . Thus Al exan der "explains" why
rape is often a capital offense by pointing out that rape "may directly interfere
with a man 's chances of reproducing via his spouse, sister, dau ghter, or other
fe male relatives" (p. 26 8); but then why is alienation of affect ion treated so
lightly? Similarly, Alexander "predicts" and confirms that "flashy dressing an d
aba ndonmen t of spouses a nd families and lawbreaki ng will be concentrated in
men who a re young ... [and poor 1 ... and are recognizable as members of
minority or other disadvantaged groups"; but why is this true only of so me such
groups, and t hen only of some of those groups' members? Alexande r explains
contradi ctory evidence away as "misdirected vestiges" of the very force he posits;
but the data he cites as direc t support of his theory might as like ly be a misdirected vestige of so me other force . Besides, Alexander's chief argument, that the
universality of differe nti a l reproduction as an ex planation of life forms cannot be
ignored, can be met without ceding Alexander any cultural territory. As Kenneth
Schaffner points out in his commentary, we m ay acknowledge a Darwinia n
accou nt of the early origins of cultural patterns without counting on differential
reproduction to explan culture's subsequent development. The very vagueness of
Alexander's account of co ntempora ry culture further supports Schaffner's counter-speculation.
Alexander's paper covers only the "is" side of the is-ought gap in a ny case;
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Alexander disavows any normative conclusions. Nor are links between science and
ethics forged successfully by the remaining papers. We are offered two essays on
Freud, one resolutely historical and the other tied in to the book's theme only via
a quick sketch of a quite abstract thesis on psychological explanation . Each paper
is interesting in its own right, but the reasons for their inclusion in the present
volume (other than historical completeness) are uncl ear. Robert Solomon's concluding essay is notable for the pointed clarity of the remarks in which he chides
his fellow-contributors for failing to address the book 's central topics. Two further essays, one on motivations for doing scientific work and the other on the
explanation of inconsistency in ethics, are rather lacking in content, at least in
comparison to other available works on the topics they address.
Why, then, this book? Th e papers on ethical theory would be at home in
professional journals, which contain many others like them. The papers which
address one or another aspect of the relation of science to ethics are a very mixed
group. Several race along using technical vocabulary without explanation and
could hardly enlighten a non-philosopher ; others seem to aim for a popular audience. Several of the papers have value chiefly as intellectual history, and others are
occasions for undisciplined theorizing which would have a hard time finding a way
into the journals. The diversity of topics addressed detracts from the primary goal
of providing numerous viewpoints on an issue of common interest.
The potential reader intereste d in ethical theory or intellectual history will find
rewarding mater ial here. The physicia n looking for enlightenment on issues involving the relation of science to ethics might be stimulated by several of the other
papers to refine his or her thinking in thi s a rea - though he or she might also be
mystified or eve n misled. As a record of an attempt to foster communication
between scholars of different disciplines with very different perspectives on
ethics - which was in fact the intent of those who convened these meetings - the
book furthers the worthy mission of the Hastings Center. The consumer, however,
might have bee n better served by a collection of essays from journals a nd other
sources, chosen for clarity, strength of argument and accessibility.
- Daniel Walker, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor and Kennedy Scholar
Program in Medical Ethics and Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin
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